Netty: HAProxy SSL TLV parsing leaks retained slice on invalid TLV length
CVE-2026-44893
What is CVE-2026-44893?
Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-codec-haproxy prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, when decoding a PP2_TYPE_SSL TLV, HAProxyMessage.readNextTLV() first calls header.retainedSlice(header.readerIndex(), length) and only then reads the 1-byte client field and 4-byte verify field. If the attacker sets the TLV length below 5, the subsequent readByte/readInt throws IndexOutOfBoundsException. HAProxyMessageDecoder only catches HAProxyProtocolException around this call, so the IOOBE propagates and the retained slice on the pooled cumulation buffer is never released. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.
Affected Version(s)
netty >= 4.2.0.Final, < 4.2.15.Final < 4.2.0.Final, 4.2.15.Final
netty < 4.1.135.Final < 4.1.135.Final